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A Rule for Committee Selection
with Soft Diversity Constraints
Haris Aziz
Abstract Committee selection with diversity or distributional constraints is a ubiqui-
tous problem. However, many of the formal approaches proposed so far have certain
drawbacks including (1) computationally intractability in general, and (2) inability to
suggest a solution for certain instances where the hard constraints cannot be met. We
propose a practical and polynomial-time algorithm for diverse committee selection
that draws on the idea of using soft bounds and satisfies natural axioms.
Keywords Social choice theory · committee voting · multi-winner voting · diversity
constraints · computational complexity
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1 Introduction
Selecting a target number of candidates is a ubiquitous problem that occurs in faculty
hiring, scholarship selection, corporate board election, and formation of representa-
tive bodies (Ratliff, 2006). In many of these settings, there are natural distributional
constraints motivated for example by diversity. For example, in several European
countries, a wide-spread constraint is having a minimum percentage of females in
corporate boards. In some school admission guidelines, there are quotas for less-
advantaged groups.
Finding the best set of candidates subject to diversity constraints has also been
formally studied in social choice. In several works, the problem of diverse commit-
tee selection is viewed as the problem with candidates having different (possibly
multiple) types and then committee having distributions constraints on each of the
types (see e.g., (Brams and Pothoff, 1990; Bredereck et al., 2018; Celis et al., 2017;
Potthoff, 1990; Straszak et al., 1993)). There are a few drawbacks of approaches that
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use hard distributional constraints. The drawbacks include the following: (1) there
may be instances of the diverse committee selection problem that do not admit any
feasible solution (for e.g., there simply may not be enough female applicants); (2)
the hard constraints often make the problem of committee selection computationally
intractable (for example, if we require that each type should have at least one rep-
resentative, the problem of checking whether there exists a committee satisfying the
requirement is NP-complete). For approaches that are NP-hard, the lack of a simple
polynomial-time algorithm makes these approaches impractical for large instances.
Even for smaller instances, these approaches cannot be used without resorting to a
computer. Finally, often real-life diversity guidelines need not be hard constraints
but general rules of thumb to achieve procedural fairness. Finally, a hard constraint
approach may also lead to a loss in efficiency.
Some other approaches consider distances between candidates or committees
based on their type attributes and then view diversity not as a constraint but
as an optimisation objective based on the distances (see e.g., (Kuo et al., 1993;
Lang and Skowron, 2016)). The approaches do not generally take into account the
excellence of the candidates and the underlying problems are NP-hard. Apart from
imposing hard distributional constraints, another approach that is often used in real-
life committee selection to achieve diversity is to give bonus points or ranking boosts
to candidates who are from under-represented groups.1 When these rules are imposed
centrally, they may come across as arbitrary fixes to solving diversity issues. If the de-
cision makers or voters internally take diversity issues into account while formulating
an objective linear ranking, it puts a cognitive burden on the voters to mix diversity
prioritisation with objective excellence estimation.
In this paper, we consider the committee selection problem with distributional
constraints and focus on the most common constraints whereby at least certain frac-
tion of the candidates should satisfy a given type.2 Our approach is to view the dis-
tributional constraints as soft constraints which should be satisfied as much as possi-
ble. We present a simple polynomial-time algorithm that simultaneously satisfies two
axioms called type optimality and justified envy-freeness. The axiom justified envy-
freeness is inspired by the matching market literature. The combination of the two
axioms can be viewed as finding a committee that as close as possible to satisfying
the hard distributional constraints and also selecting the best candidates.
2 Setup
The setting involves a set of candidates C, % a weak order over C, a set of types
T , a matrix τ that specifies whether a candidate is of a certain type, and a vector q
that specified the lower quotas bounds for each type. A diverse committee selection
instance can be summarized as (C,%, T, τ, q) where
– C = {c1, . . . , cm} is the set of candidates.
1 The model where synergies or presence of diverse agents provide additional points to the committee
has been considered in a general model by Izsak et al. (2018).
2 More general models also allow for expressing upper quotas. Often, the goal of the upper quotas can
easily be met by setting lower quotas on the complement of the set of types.
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– The weak order % over C is the priority order over the candidates.
– T = {t1, t2, ..., tℓ} is the set of types.
– τ is a matrix consisting of each candidate’s type vector where
– τc : a type vector of candidate c consisting of 1’s and 0’s
– τtc = 1 if c belongs to type t and τ
t
c = 0 otherwise.
– q is a vector consisting of all type-specific lower bounds. The value qt denotes the
lower bound for type t.
We will denote all types that a candidate c belongs to by τ(c). For c, d ∈ C, if c % d
but d  c, we will write the strict part of the relation as c ≻ d. Note that the model is
powerful enough to capture the following kind of lower bounds: “there should be at
least x members who are of one of the types from set S ⊂ T .” In that case, one can
create an ‘artificial’ type tS such that for any c ∈ C, τ
tS
c = 1 if τ
t
c = 1 for some t ∈ S .
For a committee W ⊂ C, we will denote by τ(W) =
∑
c∈W τc. We will denote
the number of candidate of type t in W by τ(W)(t). For some committee W ⊂ C, if
τ(W)(t) < qt, we will say that type t is under-represented inW.
The linear ranking overC could be based on some objective measure that reflects
the global quality of the candidate such as entrance examination scores. It could also
be based on the aggregate scores based on some positional scoring voting done by
voters who vote on the candidates (Brams and Pothoff, 1990; Bredereck et al., 2018).
Example 1 Consider the following instance.
– C = {c1, c2, c3, c4}
– c1 ≻ c2 ≻ c3 ≻ c4
– k = 2
– T = {t1, t2, t3, t4}
– τ =

1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 1 1 0

– q =
(
0 1 2 1
)
There is no feasible committee that can satisfy the hard constraints. The commit-
tee {c2, c4} satisfies all the constraints except the one corresponding to t4. It is also
more optimal than {c3, c4}. The latter does not satisfy justified envy-freeness.
3 Axioms for Diverse Committee Selection
We formalize some axiomatic properties that are desirable in our context. A commit-
tee W satisfies type distribution (x1, . . . , x|T |) if for each i, it has xi members of type
ti.
Definition 1 (domination between type distributions) A type distribution x =
(x1, . . . , x|T |) dominates another type y = (y1, . . . , y|T |) if
(i) for each ti such that yi ≥ q
i, we also have xi ≥ q
i
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(ii) for each ti such that yi < q
i, either xi ≥ q
i or |xi − q
i| ≤ |yi − q
i|
(iii) there exists some ti such that either (1) yi < q
i and xi ≥ q
i or (2) xi, yi < q
i and
|xi − q
i| ≤ |yi − q
i|.
When x dominates y, we denote it by x > y.
Next, we observe the following lemma.
Lemma 1 If τ(W) > τ(Y) and τ(Y) > τ(Z), then τ(X) > τ(Z).
The argument is as follows. If some type is not under-represented in Z, then it
also not under-represented in Y. By the same reasoning, if some type is not under-
represented in Y, then it also not under-represented in Z. Hence it follows, if some
type is under-represented in Z, then it is at most as much under-represented in Y. Also
there is one type that is less under-represented in Y than in Z. Hence, type domination
is a transitive relation.
Based on the notion of dominance between type distributions, we are now in a
position to define type optimality of a committee. Roughly speaking, a committee
is type optimal if it is ‘locally optimal’ in terms of satisfying the distributional con-
straints.
Definition 2 (Type optimal) A committeeW is type maximal if there exists no can-
didates c ∈ W and c′ ∈ C \W such that τ(W \ {c} ∪ {c′}) dominates τ(W).
We note that type optimality is desirable in terms of distributional constraints but
does not take into account the excellence of the candidates. Type optimality has been
defined in a local sense based on swaps of candidates. If we define it in a global sense
by allowing swaps of subsets of candidates with subsets of candidates, then checking
whether a given type distribution is optimal is NP-complete.
We now present an axiom that avoids scenarios where a candidate may feel
that she deserves the place of a lesser ranked candidate. The axiom is adapted
from the literature on stable matching with distributional constraints (Kurata et al.,
2017; Goto et al., 2017; Kojima et al., 2014; Ehlers et al., 2014; Kamada and Kojima,
2015).
Definition 3 (Justified envy-freeness) A committee W satisfies justified envy-
freeness if there is no candidate c < W and c′ ∈ W such that c ≻ c′ and there
exists no type ti ∈ τ(c
′) \ τ(c) such that the number of candidates in W of type ti is
less than or equal to qi.
We note that justified envy-freeness by itself can be trivially satisfied by a com-
mittee that selects the top k ranked candidates. However, such a committee may not
respect any of the distributional constraints.
We have identified justified envy-freeness and type optimality as two axioms that
individuallymay not have enough bite but together form a meaningful combination of
axioms that lead to a desirable committee. Note that any committee that is optimal and
satisfies the hard distributional constraints is both type optimal and satisfies justified
envy-freeness. If it is not type optimal, then is not feasible. If it does not satisfy
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justified envy-freeness, then a swap of two candidates can increase the welfare of the
committee without violating its hard constraints which means that the committee was
not optimal subject to the constraints. In the next section, we present an algorithm
that returns a committee satisfying both axioms.
4 A Rule for Diverse Committee Selection
We are in a position to present our algorithm (Algorithm 1) to find a diverse com-
mittee. In the first stage, the algorithm first checks if there is a type that is under-
represented and then selects the highest priority candidate who satisfies such a type.
The first stage is along similar lines as the Greedy Algorithm I of Bredereck et al.
(2018). If no type is under-represented, then the algorithm adds the required num-
ber of highest ranking candidates. The second stage is geared towards obtaining a
good type distribution. If the committee does not satisfy type optimality, candidates
are exchanged with the goal to satisfy type optimality until it is satisfied. In the final
while loop, the algorithm allows swaps of candidates if there is justified envy. The
algorithm stops when the committee satisfies justified envy-freeness.
Algorithm 1 Rule for finding a desirable committee satisfying soft distributional
constraints on types
Input: (C,%, T, τ, q).
Output: W ⊆ C such that |W | = k
1: W ←− ∅
2: while |W | < k and there is some type t that is underrepresented do
3: Add a highest priority candidate of that type t toW.
4: end while
5: if |W | < k then
6: Select the highest ranked k − |W | candidates from C \W intoW.
7: end if
8: while there is a candidate c < W and candidate c′ ∈ W such that τ(W \ {c′} ∪ {c})
dominates τ(W) do
9: W ←− (W \ {c′}) ∪ {c}
10: end while
11: while there is a candidate c < W who has justified envy for some candidate
c′ ∈ W do
12: W ←− (W \ {c′}) ∪ {c}
13: end while
14: return W
Let us illustrate the algorithm on our running example.
Example 2 Consider the following instance.
– C = {c1, c2, c3, c4}
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– c1 ≻ c2 ≻ c3 ≻ c4
– k = 2
– T = {t1, t2, t3, t4}
– τ =

1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 1 1 0

– q =
(
0 1 2 1
)
The algorithm first considers a type t2 that is under-represented and selects c2. It
then considers type t3 that is under-represented and selects c3. At this point the type
distribution is not optimal and can be improved by the exchange of c2 with c4 so that
W = {c3, c4}. At this point the committee is type optimal and also satisfies justified
envy-freeness.
Proposition 1 Algorithm 1 returns in time O(|C|2) a committee that satisfies justified
envy-freeness.
Proof. Note that by Step 7, we already have a committee of size k. The first while
loop takes time at most O(k|C|). In the second while loop, the type distribution keeps
improving since the type domination relation is transitive (Lemma 1), but there can
be at most |C| such improvements. Finally, in the last while loop, with each swap of
candidates, a candidate is replaced by a candidate with a higher ranking. This can
happen at most O(|C|2) times. ⊓⊔
Although Algorithm 1 finds a type optimal committee by Step 10, the committee
undergoes further changes in the final while loop. We now argue that the returned
committee still satisfies type optimality.
Proposition 2 Algorithm 1 returns a committee satisfying type optimality.
Proof. In the second while loop, we start from a committee of size k. By the end of
Step 10,W is a committee that is type optimal. In the final while loop, we implement
swaps if there is a candidate c < W who has justified envy for some candidate c′ ∈ W.
Suppose we swap c′ with c. We claim that W \ {c′} ∪ {c} is also type optimal. Since
c had a justified envy against c′, by definition of justified envy, there exists no type
ti ∈ τ(c
′) \ τ(c) such that the number of candidates inW of type ti is less than or equal
to qi. If there is a type ti such that τ(W)(i) ≥ q
i, then τ(W \{c′}∪{c})(i) ≥ qi. In words,
if a type not under-represented in W, it is not under-represented in W \ {c′} ∪ {c}. If
there is a type ti such that τ(W)(i) < q
i, then τ(W)(i) ≤ τ(W \ {c′} ∪ {c})(i) ≤ qi.
In words, if a type is under-represented in W, it is at most as under-represented in
W \ {c′} ∪ {c}. Thus τ(W \ {c′} ∪ {c}) is as good as τ(W). Since W was type optimal,
W \ {c′} ∪ {c} is type optimal as well. ⊓⊔
We have shown that our algorithm simultaneously satisfies both type optimal-
ity and justified envy-freeness. Since these are two key properties satisfied by opti-
mal committees satisfying hard constraints, our algorithm provides a computationally
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easy and principled rule to find desirable committees that almost satisfy the distribu-
tional constraints. Although each of the stages of the algorithm is based on natural
greedy or local swap-based approaches, our formulation of reasonable axioms pro-
vide a guiding force towards a committee that is desirable. It will be interesting to see
if other desirable axioms can be simultaneously satisfied in the conjunction with the
ones which our algorithm satisfies.
Our general algorithm can have more precise specifications that prioritise cer-
tain types in a lexicographical manner or implement swaps according to some pre-
determined pattern. The % ranking order can be derived by using some social welfare
function for a set of voters voting on the quality of the candidates.
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